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Sammendrag 
Denne artikkelen presenterer en ny metode for utregning av Gini-koeffisienter fra tabuleringer av 
gjennomsnittsinntekten til sosiale grupper. Fordelingsdata fra tiden før den industrielle revolusjon er 
gjerne å finne som slike ”sosiale tabeller”. I litteraturen regnes ulikhetsmål fra sosiale tabeller ofte ut 
uten å ta hensyn til ulikhet innad i grupper. Dette fører til en systematisk skjevhet, slik at ulikhet fra 
førindustriell tid oppgis som lavere enn den faktisk var. 
 
Metoden som presenteres i denne artikkelen anvendes på en eksisterende samling av 25 sosiale 
tabeller, fra Roma i år 1 til India i 1947. Korreksjonene utføres med flere ulike antakelser om 
inntektsspredning innad i gruppene, og gir i alle tilfeller vesentlig høyere Gini-koeffisienter. Når 
ulikhetsnivået kombineres med BNP-estimater framkommer en positiv samvariasjon mellom ulikhet 
og økonomisk vekst. Dette støtter tidligere studier, basert på færre datapunkter, som antyder en 
”super-Kuznetskurve” med stigende ulikhet i hele den førindustrielle perioden. 
 
1 Introduction
Not much is known about inequality in the very long run. The lack of data has
been addressed by Milanovic et al. (2011), who collect a large set of social tables.
The social tables give data on the size and average income of social classes in many
pre-industrial societies, with the catch that the income distribution within each
class is unknown. This paper uses these social tables to draw inference on the
long-run development of inequality, as well as the relationship between inequality
and growth, while explicitly allowing for different levels of within-group inequality.
The dimension of within-group inequality is missing in Milanovic et al., leading to
too low reported Gini coefficients.
1.1 Inequality in the very long run
The seminal contribution on the long-run evolution of inequality is Kuznets (1955).
Using a few observations from the United States, England and Germany, Kuznets
argues that inequality goes up with the industrial revolution and then decreases
with modernization. While Kuznets treats the Industrial Revolution as a rather
specific process (he dates the possible “widening phase” in England as going from
1780 to 1850, and postulates even shorter periods for the other countries), more
recent views on industrialization stress the changes as being more gradual.
Kuznets based his conclusions on a very small data set. Over the years, better
estimates of inequality through the Industrial Revolution has emerged; a macroeco-
nomic picture of the entire post-1820 period is given by Bourguignon & Morrisson
(2002). However, data on the period before 1820 remains sparse. Van Zanden
(1995) uses data on European cities and argues that the period of increasing in-
equality started before the Industrial Revolution.1 He documents a positive corre-
lation between growth and inequality in European cities after the mid-1500s, with
the growth-inequality relationship switching sign some time between 1870 and
1900. Lindert (2000) finds weak evidence of increasing inequality in Britain and
the United States from the 1700s, again with a peak in inequality some time after
industrialization. Hoffman et al. (2002) adjust for changing consumption baskets
1The term “super Kuznets curve”, meaning a positive relationship between growth and in-
equality going further back than proposed by Kuznets, is due to van Zanden.
4
in several European countries and find that this makes the increasing-inequality
trends even stronger, in particular before 1650 (their analysis starts in 1500).
The most comprehensive analysis of pre-industrial inequality so far is given by
Milanovic et al. (2011). The authors collect a comprehensive set of social tables
- listing social groups, their sizes and incomes for 25 country-time points. The
main body of their paper discusses the relationship between economic activity and
feasible inequality levels, but the data is publicly available and ready to be used
for other purposes.2
Social group Share of pop. Per capita in-
come (nomisma
per year)
Income in terms
of per capita
mean
Tenants 0.37 3.5 0.56
Urban “marginals” 0.02 3.51 0.56
Farmers 0.52 3.8 0.61
Workers 0.03 6 0.97
Army 0.01 6.5 1.05
Traders, skilled craftsmen 0.035 18 2.90
Large landowners 0.01 25 4.02
Nobility 0.005 350 56.31
Table 1: Example of social table: Byzantium, ca year 1000. Source: Milanovic
et al. (2007), based on Milanovic (2006)
An example of a social table is given in Table 1. It lists the social classes in
Byzantium, ca year 1000. The data set used in this paper consists of 25 such social
tables, with a varying number of groups and class definitions. Though far from a
balanced panel (only a few countries have observations for more than one period),
this is the first comprehensive cross-region data series on pre-industrial inequality,
as opposed to the more country- or region-specific discussions of the other studies.
2Milanovic et al. have a total of 28 observations. For two of these (Holland 1561 and Japan
1886) they do not appear to have access to the underlying data. For another two (Tuscany
1427 and Bihar 1807) the data is not available in a format based on social groups. For the
remaining 24 observations, based on a wide range of studies described in their paper, I thank
Branko Milanovic for supplying the dataset; most of the observations are also available online at
http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/. The working paper version of their paper (Milanovic et al., 2007)
has a fuller exposition of the data and methodology.
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1.2 Interpolating inequality: Limitations of existing ap-
proaches
Common for all elaborations on pre-industrial inequality is the need for some
type of interpolation. Often a combination of techniques is used, as the data
available can be of many types. For example, Lindert (2000) uses a combination
of social tables, factor prices, wage data, and land holdings, as well as more detailed
data on wealth and income for the richer parts of the population. In most cases,
information on the distribution among the poor is particularly hard to find.
For the social tables collected by Milanovic et al. (2011), we have the advantage
of a comprehensive table for the entire population.3 For each social class, we
have an estimate of mean income of the group, as well as the relative size of the
group. The distribution within each group, however, is not known. For this reason,
analyzing inequality using social tables data requires additional assumptions on
the characteristics of the social groups.
A natural starting point is to consider a distribution where the entire group is
concentrated at its mean income. Taking the “farmers” in Table 1 as an example,
this would mean that all farmers had an income of 3.8 nomisma per year. With
this, it is straightforward to calculate an inequality measure such as the Gini
coefficient. Milanovic et al. (2011) describe this as the lower bound of the Gini
coefficient, and denote it as “Gini1”. In the following, this will be referred to as
a “point distribution”, as the population is concentrated at a finite number of
points.4
Going one step further, we can think of a distribution where all the members
of group i are poorer than all members of group i+ 1; in the terms of Table 1, all
“tenants” are poorer than the poorest farmer. This will be referred to as a popu-
lation being perfectly sorted by groups; in other words, there is no overlap between
the population ranges. For group borders at midpoints between group means, Mi-
lanovic et al. (2011) denote this as “Gini2”, but we could also conceive a situation
3There is of course substantial uncertainty inherent in compiling the tables. This goes for
any pre-industrial data series, including wage and other price series, and will not be discussed
further here.
4Analytical expressions will be detailed below; the “point distribution” Gini is equal to the
between-group Gini, given in Equation (7).
6
where we set the group borders so as to maximize the inequality consistent with
the assumption of perfect sorting.
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Figure 1: Lorenz curve and Gini coefficients for two restrictive assumptions
For most social table distributions, the assumption of perfect sorting greatly
limits the possible Gini coefficients. An illustration of this is shown in Figure 1,
which shows the Lorenz curve for a population of four groups. The Lorenz curve
plots cumulative population against cumulative income, and the area between
the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line is equal to the Gini coefficient of the
population. When groups are perfectly sorted, the points (0, 0), (P1, Z1), ... are
known; (Pi, Zi) refers to the cumulative population and income of all groups up to
group i. If there is no dispersion within groups, the Lorenz curve is given by the
solid line, and the minimum Gini is the shaded area in the figure.
Now consider a set of within-group dispersions that preserves the perfect or-
dering of incomes by groups. The points (Pi, Zi) still have to be on the Lorenz
curve. Moreover, by the definition of the Lorenz curve, it must always be weakly
convex — the Lorenz curve plots population sorted by income, and the slope of
the curve corresponds to the income of an individual at that point. It follows that
the most outward-lying Lorenz curve is a series of straight lines going through the
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points (Pi, Zi) with kinks somewhere between these points; an example of such a
line is the dotted line in the figure. Correspondingly, the Gini coefficient can only
go up by the area between the solid and dotted line.5
The max-inequality Lorenz reflects a distribution where the population of a
group is concentrated at the two extremes of the income groups’ range; the richest
individuals in group i have the same income as the poorest in group i + 1. The
position of these income and population points, denoted (ψi, ζi) in the figure,
that gives the highest possible Gini is in general not easy to find in closed form.
However, as is evident from the figure, for most distributions the scope of increasing
the area between the solid and dotted lines is very limited, and becomes more so
as the number of groups goes up.
For a few “pre-industrial” societies, we do have information on inequality both
within and across groups. This does allow for some examination of whether the
restrictions described here are empirically relevant.
1.3 Overlaps between groups in pre-industrial societies
Of the 28 income distributions used by Milanovic et al., two allow for more detailed
analysis of within-group distributions.
The estimate for Tuscany, 1427 uses data from the full-count Catasto (tax
census). While the income estimates used by MLW appends wage data taken from
other sources (without within-group information), the Catasto itself has wealth
data and makes possible a full-count estimation of aggregate and decomposed
wealth Gini coefficients.
The second source is the expenditure survey of Bihar, 1807. While there is no
combined table with both social class/occupation and expenditure, expenditures
are reported separately for rural and urban locations.
A third source, not used by MLW, is a report containing income distributions
for Norway, 1868. For a set of 26 occupational groups, the number of adult
males earning above a threshold level (around the upper third of the adult-male
income distribution) is given, separated into five income groups. From this data
5A related analytical proof for the case when group interval borders are given is found in
Gastwirth (1972).
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we can construct aggregate and decomposed income Gini coefficients, contingent
on earning above the threshold level.
The commonly used decomposition of the Gini coefficient, used, for example,
by Lambert & Aronson (1993), divides total inequality into three components.
Between-group inequality, GB, follows directly from group means and is the in-
equality that the population would have if there was no inequality within groups.
Within-group inequality, GW , is a weighted sum of the Gini coefficient each group
would have if it was a separate population. The remainding inequality, which is
zero if there is no overlap between groups, is often referred to as “residual inequal-
ity” and will be denoted GR. It is worth noting that the restriction of “no overlap”
not only affects GR, but also puts bounds on the within-group inequality.
Country Unit # groups G GB GW GR
Tuscany, 1427 Wealth 97 occupations 75.2 46.5 19.4 9.3
Bihar, 1807 Expenditure 2 sectors 35.3 2.1 29.2 4.1
Norway, 1868 Income (upper 1/3) 26 occupations 29.2 15.2 5.9 8.1
Table 2: Pre-industrial societies with within-group data
For the three pre-industrial societies for which we have data, the three compo-
nents of the Gini coefficient can be calculated separately, as shown in Table 2. It is
clear that between-group inequality only accounts for a small part of inequality in
these three societies. The extreme example is Bihar, where two large groups have
means that are very close, but for the two other samples there is also substan-
tial within-group inequality. Even though the overlap term (GR) is moderate, the
within-group inequality also far surpasses the inequality allowed by “no overlap”.
To see this, consider the methods of Section 1.2 applied to the three data sets, as
shown in Table 3.
Country Gini with point Max Gini with “True” Gini
distribution (GB) no overlap
Tuscany, 1427 46.5 52.9 75.2
Bihar, 1807 2.1 19.6 35.3
Norway, 1868 15.2 15.4 29.2
Table 3: Inequality with and without overlap
For each country, everyone were given their group mean income and inequal-
9
ity was calculated. This is the first column. The second column gives the Gini
coefficient with the maximum dispersion consistent with “no overlap”. The final
column gives the Gini calculated from micro data. It is evident from the table
that the limitation of “no overlap” is severe; in all cases, the difference between
the group-calculated Ginis and the true Ginis are more than 10. This highlights
the importance of relaxing the no-overlap restriction when calculating inequality
from group data.
The limitation of assuming perfectly sorted groups, if this does not correspond
to known characteristics of the underlying population, is the main motivation for
imposing within-group distributions that have overlaps between the income ranges
of groups. This will be the topic of the next section.
2 Social tables and log-normal group distribu-
tions
2.1 The distribution of income within groups
To put some structure on the within-group dispersion of income, it will be as-
sumed for the remainder of this paper that income within each social class is
log-normally distributed. The log-normal distribution is commonly used to model
income inequality. For a stochastic process with a given population, where rela-
tive changes in incomes are random, the central limit theorem yields a log-normal
distribution for this population (see, for instance, Crow & Shimizu (1987, chap.
1), citing Gibrat (1930, 1931)). If group incomes are log-normally distributed,
the corresponding theoretical justification is that while the conventional stochas-
tic processes operate within groups, there is no mobility between groups. While
somewhat stylized, this is a reasonable and easily understood assumption, in par-
ticular on historical data.6
With log-normal distributions within groups, the aggregate distribution will
6The pre-industrial distributions discussed in the previous section have some “bracketed”
data within each group, making formal tests of distributional shapes difficult without further
assumptions. However, some evidence points toward groupwise lognormality in these cases. See
Appendix, Section A.1 for details.
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not itself be log-normal. Rather, it captures the salient features of a presum-
ably stratified society; the distribution shape will reflect the group data and its
smoothness will depend on within-group dispersion. The log-normal distribution
has mass along the entire positive income range; correspondingly, there will be
overlap between groups and the Lorenz curve will pass to the right of the points
(Pi, Zi) in Figure 1.
The log-normal distribution is most conveniently expressed in terms of µ, the
mean of log income, and σ, the standard deviation of log income.Denoting the
mean income of a group as yi and the standard deviation of the income as si, the
expressions for these parameters are
µi = log(yi)− 1
2
log
(
1 +
(
si
yi
)2)
= log(yi)− σ
2
i
2
(1)
σ2i = log
(
1 +
(
si
yi
)2)
(2)
The cumulative distribution function (cdf) is
FL(x;µ, σ) = Φ
(
log(x)− µ
σ
)
(3)
where Φ(·) is the standard cumulative normal distribution,
Φ(x) = 1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞ exp
(
−t2
2
)
dt.
Denoting the relative size of each group (social class) as pi and the total num-
ber of groups as N , it follows that the aggregate cumulative income distribution
function of the population is defined as
F (x) =
N∑
i=1
[
piF
L(x;µi, σi)
]
(4)
where µi and σi are defined by (1) and (2).
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2.2 Calculating Gini coefficients from group data
Following Aitchison & Brown (1957), the expression for the Gini coefficient for a
log-normal distribution is given by G = 2Φ(σ/
√
2)−1. Extending their procedure
to the case of many groups, the expression for the Gini coefficient is
G =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
pipj
yi
y¯
2Φ
µi − µj + σ2i√
σ2i + σ
2
j
− 1
 (5)
where y¯ is the population mean income,
∑N
i=1 piyi.
7
This expression has N2 terms; two for each combination of i and j. Each of the
terms considers a separate part of the Lorenz square;8 group i’s share of income
piyi/y¯ (on the vertical axis) is multiplied with group j’s share of population pj (on
the horizontal axis). If there was no overlap, these parts would be separate rect-
angles and constitute a grid; however, in this case, the areas should be considered
as density functions over the entire square. Each of these areas are weighted by a
number between −1 and 1, depending on the corresponding values of µ and σ for
the two groups. The sum of these weighted squares is a measure of the distance
between all individuals; the Gini coefficient.
The relative simplicity of the equation comes from two features of the log-
normal distribution. First, multiplying a constant with a log-normally distributed
variable returns another log-normally distributed variable. Second, the convolu-
tion of two log-normally distributed variables is itself log-normally distributed.
Combining this with the definition of the Gini coefficient from the Lorenz curve,
we find (5) as described in the Appendix.
As the expression (5) has many more terms than the number of groups, and
some of the terms are negative, it is not straightforward to interpret the effect of
7To the knowledge of this author, the result in Equation (5) is not previously published. The
details of the calculation are given in the Appendix, section B.1. After the first working paper
edition of this paper, Young (2011) has independently derived a similar expression, in the context
of modern (national and global) income inequality.
8The term “Lorenz square” refers to the square on which the Lorenz curve is plotted; the
horizontal axis represent aggregate population, sorted from poorest to richest, while the vertical
axis represent cumulative aggregate income.
12
different parameters on the resulting Gini coefficient. For this reason, it is more
convenient to work with a re-formulated expression. First, replace the parameter
µ with the group means, using (1).9 Second, add each ij term to the corresponding
ji term to get the preferred expression for the Gini coefficient
G =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
pipj
yj
y¯
2Φ
 log
(
yj
yi
)
√
σ2i + σ
2
j
+
√
σ2i + σ
2
j
2
− 1
− yi
y¯
2Φ
 log
(
yj
yi
)
√
σ2i + σ
2
j
−
√
σ2i + σ
2
j
2
− 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Across-group inequality (GA = GB +GR)
+
N∑
i=1
p2i
yi
y¯
[
2Φ
(
σi√
2
)
− 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within-group inequality (GW )
(6)
which is decomposed into across-group (henceforth defined as GA = GB +GR)
and within-group inequality.10
The first term of (6) is the sum of inequality across groups; all pairwise compar-
isons between individuals in group i and individuals in group j. We can contrast
this to the Gini coefficient for no within-group dispersion, which is the population-
weighted sum of all pairwise differences between the groups
9One could also substitute in s for σ, but this does not add clarity; as the Gini coefficient is
a relative measure, the standard deviation only enters scaled, as s/y, and this can just as well
be summarized in the σ measure.
The Gini coefficient expressed only in means and standard deviations is
G =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
pipj
yi
y¯
2Φ
 log
(
yi
yj
)
√
log
[(
1 +
s2i
y2i
)(
1 +
s2j
y2j
)] +
√
log
[(
1 +
s2i
y2i
)(
1 +
s2j
y2j
)]
2
− 1

10GB , GR and GW were defined in Section 1.3. The decomposition into GA and GW corre-
sponds to the classification suggested by Ebert (2010), who denotes GA as the “between” compo-
nent. The analysis here is also related to Yitzhaki & Lerman (1991), who study the relationship
between stratification and inequality. The aggregate group data can be construed as giving strati-
fication but not inequality, and the Gini coefficients presented here measure stratification-induced
inequality differences between populations.
13
G0 =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
pipj
(
yj
y¯
− yi
y¯
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Between-group inequality (GB)
(7)
and see that the expressions are closely related. GA differs from GB in that
the group means are modified by a number between −1 and 1; the evaluation of
the 2Φ(·)− 1 function.
The values for y and p in a given population are known from the social tables.
The dispersion, however, is not. It is therefore of interest to know how the in-
equality of a population changes when dispersion changes - how G changes with
si, or σi. From Equation (6), increases in G can be decomposed into increases in
across-group inequality and increases in within-group inequality.
2.3 De-composing inequality effects
The across-group Gini is always increasing with group dispersion. Formally, this
effect can be evaluated by taking the derivative of the across-group Gini by the
dispersion measure of one or both groups. The derivative is always positive; an
increase in dispersion will always increase the across-group Gini coefficient.11 Be-
cause the log-normal distribution has positive mass across the entire income range,
there is always some overlap; this is why the across-group term depends on σ even
for small dispersions.
Milanovic (2002, p. 82-83) discusses the relationship between group means,
group dispersions and income overlaps. He shows that for the overlap to be small,
groups must either be very homogeneous internally (low within-group dispersion),
or their mean incomes must be very far apart. Equation (6) allows for a formal
11The derivative with respect to σ2i + σ
2
j is
∂GA
∂
√
σ2i + σ
2
j
=
yj
y¯
φ
 log
(
yj
yi
)
√
σ2i + σ
2
j
+
√
σ2i + σ
2
j
2
+ yi
y¯
φ
 log
(
yj
yi
)
√
σ2i + σ
2
j
−
√
σ2i + σ
2
j
2

The derivative with respect to σi or ci = si/yi can then be found by the chain rule; this will not
change the sign.
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discussion of this. Consider an increase in the dispersion of group j, and the mean
pairwise income difference between individuals in group j and (the poorer) group
i. If the groups did not overlap; there would be no change; the lower distance
resulting from a decrease in the income of the poorer individuals would be exactly
offset by the increase in the income of the richer individuals, as the mean of
group j is unchanged. With overlap, however, some of the poorest j-individuals
are moving away from the richest i-individuals; the overlap makes the effect of
increased dispersion greater. The degree of overlap is again influenced by the
distance between groups (log
(
yj
yi
)
) and the dispersion level (σ2i +σ
2
j ). This means
that lower distance between groups increases the effect on the overlap term from
increasing dispersion; groups that are close will have larger overlaps. The effect of
changing dispersion is smaller for very large or very small dispersions; this reflects
the bounding of the Gini coefficient to be between 0 and 1.
The last term in (6) is the sum of within-group Gini coefficients; a weighted
sum of the Gini coefficients for log-normal distributions as reported by Aitchison &
Brown (1957). It is straightforward to see that the within-group Gini increases with
dispersion. As within-group pairs constitute a relatively small part of all possible
pairs, the weights are low; for small groups, the squaring of the population share
means that the resulting inequality contribution is low.
Returning to the aggregate Gini coefficient, it is useful to verify that Equation
(6) takes on familiar values at the extremes of dispersion. First, consider a sit-
uation where within-group dispersion approaches zero: σi → 0; in that case, the
across-group Gini collapses to the between-group Gini (7) as both Φ functions are
evaluated at plus infinity. Similarly, we can consider a situation where dispersion
approaches infinity; in that case, as σ → ∞, the Φ evaluations on yj and yi are
evaluated at plus and minus infinity, respectively. The Gini coefficient approaches∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 pipjyi/y¯, which sums to 1; full inequality.
2.4 Finding within-group dispersions
From the discussion above we now know that when group distributions are log-
normal, we can calculate aggregate and composite inequality measures in closed
form, given group sizes, means and standard deviations. The standard deviations
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are not in the social tables. Because of this, we have to make a case for the “correct”
level of within-group dispersion in each case to calculate aggregate inequality.
The following paragraphs discuss three possible ways of inferring reasonable
ranges for inequality within groups. We will describe dispersion within each group
in terms of coefficients of variation, ci = si/yi. In Section 3 below, a wide range
of dispersion parameters will be examined.
Within-group dispersion in pre-industrial societies
From the three pre-industrial distributions discussed in Section 1.3, one can cal-
culate the magnitude of dispersion directly. The means (across groups) of three
inequality coefficients are reported in Table 4: the coefficient of variation c, the
variance of log income (or wealth) σ˜2, and the within-group Gini coefficient Gi.
Population Mean c Mean σ˜2 Mean Gi
Tuscany, 1427 (Wealth) 2.12 2.03 0.64
Bihar, 1807 0.75 0.36 0.34
Norway, 1868 0.48 0.21 0.20
Table 4: Within-group inequality in pre-industrial societies
As explained above, all of these groups have some peculiarities in terms of the
data. In the case of Tuscany, the data is on wealth, not distribution. In the case
of Norway, the income data is only for the upper third of the distribution. And
for Bihar, we only have two sectors. Moreover, some of the Bihar households are
very large, which potentially leads to an underestimation of inequality as we have
no within-household distribution data.
The limitations in the Bihar and Norway data can help explain why the mea-
sured inequality levels are so much lower than in Tuscany. On the other hand,
the values for Tuscany are probably too high, as they concern wealth inequality,
not income inequality. As all these three pre-industrial distributions have some
limitation in terms of coverage, it will be useful to also look at income data for
modern periods to learn more about within-group dispersion.
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Within-group dispersion in modern societies
Census or other survey data often include information on income, as well as several
characteristics that makes it possible to group the population into “social classes”
corresponding to the social tables. Using data from the International Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series (Minnesota Population Center, 2010), the coefficient
of variation of income can be calculated for groups based on occupation, industry
and employment class. For nine developed and developing countries between 1970
and 2007, a summary of the group data is given in Table 5.12
Classification Mean of cmin Mean of cmedian Mean of cmax Mean # of groups
Occupation 1.0 1.3 3.1 9.4
Industry 0.9 1.5 2.9 13.9
Empl.classification 1.5 2.0 6.0 2.7
Empl.class (detailed) 1.1 1.7 6.1 5.8
Table 5: Within-group inequality (coefficient of variation) in modern societies
The range of variation coefficients is not large. Comparing the dispersion in
the most and least diverse groups, for less than half of the country-years is the
former more than three times the latter. Moreover, the the mean and minimum
of the dispersion of groups are quite similar. The median within-group coefficient
of variation is between 0.7 (Canada, 1981) and 4.8 (Mexico, 2000), with most
being around 1. There is no clear relationship between development status and
dispersion, though the groupings by “employment class” consistently yield higher
dispersions than the other two groupings. In any case, Gini coefficients of pre-
industrial inequality should be calculated for dispersions (coefficients of variations)
somewhere in the range between 1 and 2. Both of these will be used in the following
section.
To rule out a systematic relationship between within-group dispersion and the
number of groups, we can regress the average dispersion within a sample (that
is, a country-year-classification set) on the number of groups in the same sample.
Denoting as c¯j the average coefficient of variation over, for example, occupation
groups in Brazil in 1970, and Nj as the number of such occupation groups, we
12The countries are Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Puerto Rico, South Africa,
United States and Venezuela. A fuller exposition is given in the Appendix, table A.1.
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have the regression equation c¯ = α + βN for all the country-year combinations
for a given classification. For all four classifications separately, as well as a pooled
regression with and without classification dummies, the null hypothesis of β = 0
cannot be rejected at a 95% level.
If the dispersion of income c within a group was correlated with the level of
income, we would have to take account for this in our assumptions on dispersion.
However, this does not appear to be the case. Running the regression ci = α +
βyi for each sample separately, β is only significantly different from zero in a
small minority of cases. Hence, it will be assumed that coefficients of variations
are constant across groups; that standard deviations are proportional to group
income.13
Well-apportioned groups
In addition to inference from modern data, we can draw a restriction on the coeffi-
cient of variation from the group structure in the social tables, by saying that the
weighted sum of within-group Ginis should not be larger than the between-group
Ginis. This could be justified by saying that groups should be “well-apportioned”;
for a group to have a separate identity when tabulating incomes, the differences
within the group should be less than the differences across the groups. The level
of dispersion consistent with this well-apportioned assumption will be denoted cw;
it will differ across societies (it is derived from the group means and sizes). To
calculate cw, insert for the definition of σ (2) and the dispersion structure in the
expression for within-group inequality in (6), and equate the average within-group
dispersion with the between-group Gini.
The standard deviation of logs becomes σw =
√
2Φ−1
(
G0+1
2
)
. Inserted in (5),
we get the expression for the upper bound on the Gini coefficient consistent with
well-apportioned groups:
13Details of the regressions are given in the Appendix, Section A.2. For the case of the
“industry” classification, 19 out of 29 samples have significantly (at 95%) negative correlations
between income and the coefficient of variation. For this reason, a robustness check with a
more flexible relationship between c and y is also done: we assume a relationship between
(scaled) standard deviations and group means of the form ci = α(yi/y¯)
β (the method used here
corresponds to β = 0). Estimates using β = −0.3 (a typical value for the non-zero regression
results) instead are discussed in the Appendix, section C.3; the results are similar to those in the
main text.
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G“well-apportioned” =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
pipj
yi
y¯
2Φ
Φ−1(GB + 1
2
)
+
log
(
yi
yj
)
2Φ−1
(
GB+1
2
)
− 1

(8)
where GB is given by Equation (7); that is, the expression depends only on
the means and group sizes in the original data. For a simple back-of-the enve-
lope calculation of inequality comparison across societies, Equation (8) is a good
candidate. The dispersion cw makes the within-group Gini for each group equal
to the between-group Gini of the population. It can be seen as an upper bound
of dispersion by making the following claim: if within-group dispersion was really
bigger than cw, the compiler of the table would not have chosen the groups in this
way, as they do not add to the “structuring” of information about the society.
3 Re-evaluating pre-industrial inequality
With the methodology in place, pre-industrial inequality can be re-evaluated using
the social table data compiled by Milanovic et al.. The overall level of inequality
goes up by a large amount when within-group inequality is accounted for. In
addition, changing dispersion also affects how we rank the various societies in
terms of inequality.
Seven different sets of assumptions on within-group dispersion will be illus-
trated. The first and second set are the measures used by Milanovic et al.. Their
“Gini1” assumes no within-group inequality — this is the “point distributions” dis-
cussed above — and is equal to the between-group Gini coefficient.14 The “Gini2”
variable is the inequality associated with within-group inequality and perfect group
sorting, for given group interval borders, as described by Kakwani (1980, chap. 6).
While Gini1 corresponds to c = 0, Gini2 does not map into the methodology used
in this paper.
For the groupwise log-normal distributions, the coefficient of variation will be
14The between-group Gini, GB , can be calculated by Equation (7).
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assumed constant across groups.15 The values for c shown here will be 0.1, 0.5, 1
and 2, covering most of the range discussed above. There will also be an assump-
tion set with “well-apportioned” groups, where the within-group Gini coefficients
are equal to the between-group coefficients. These differ between populations,
as the estimates are calculated from group means and sizes, but are still constant
across groups within each population.16 The assumption sets used are summarized
in Table 6.
# Within-group dispersion Var. coeff Var. of log Gini within groups
c σ2 = log(1 + c2) Gi = 2Φ(σ/
√
2)− 1
1 None (MLW “Gini1”) 0 0 0
2 Perfect sorting (MLW “Gini2”) - - -
3 Very low 0.1 0.01 0.06
4 Low 0.5 0.22 0.26
5 Intermediate 1 0.69 0.44
6 High 2 1.61 0.63
7 “Well-apportioned” cw - -
Table 6: Assumptions on within-group dispersions
3.1 The level of inequality in pre-industrial societies
The Gini coefficients increase significantly when within-group dispersion is ac-
counted for. Figure 2 shows how the calculated Gini coefficients are sensitive to
assumptions on within-group dispersion. The Gini estimates used by Milanovic
et al. (“Gini1” and “Gini2”) span only a small range of the possible values. Even
the low coefficient of variance assumption of c = 0.1 gives higher Gini estimates
for all but eight populations; increasing c to 0.35 leaves only Moghul India with
higher Gini2. Like other populations with few groups, Moghul India has a large
group containing the majority of the population; unlike the other populations,
however, this group is not the poorest, and the income distance to the richer and
poorer groups is relatively high. This allows for high inequality while preserving
the assumption of no overlap. In the terms of Figure 1, the data points for Moghul
15Most results hold up to other linear relationships between si and yi. This is detailed in the
Appendix, Table C.5 and Figure C.1.
16See Equation (8) for the calculation of the well-apportioned groups.
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India allow a large distance between the solid and dotted line, while for the other
populations, this space is very small.
From Section 2.4 above, we know that the most coherent modern-day social
groups have coefficients of income variations between .5 and 1. Using the still
low value of c = 0.5, the calculated Gini coefficients for all the pre-industrial
populations are higher than the Gini2 value. Further increasing within-group
dispersion to c = 2, all Gini coefficients are higher than 0.7; very high inequality
by any standard.
There is some change in sorting as c increases. At c = 0.5, around 7 per cent
of all pairwise comparisons of societies change; at c = 2 this number has increased
to 13 per cent. Above c = 2 the re-shuﬄing does not increase much more.17
For the societies with higher between-group inequality, that is, the lower half of
Figure 2, the sorting of societies is almost perfectly preserved — for example, by
all measures, England and Wales in 1759 was just a little bit more unequal than
in 1688. Hence, we can conclude that while the level of inequality is very sensitive
to assumptions on within-group dispersions, the ranking is not.
With a large within-group dispersion measure, c = 2, calculated Gini coeffi-
cients are in some cases more than twice as large as the benchmark values. If
inequality in these societies was this high, the value of the social tables data is
low, as we would expect there to be variation in dispersion between populations,
making it harder to rank the societies with respect to each other.
It could be a source of concern if the Gini coefficient of a population was highly
dependent on the number of groups in that population. On the one hand, a high
number of recorded groups could reflect a highly stratified society with correspond-
ing inequality. On the other hand, we must assume that the number of recorded
groups also reflects some pragmatism on the associated (often contemporary) re-
searcher’s part, with respect to how much data it is possible to collect. In any
case, there is not a high correlation between the number of groups and the Gini
estimates; for all estimation sets, linear OLS regression does not yield a significant
slope parameter.18
17For comparison, the expected change in pairwise sorting for random data sets is around 1/2
(50%).
18This holds regardless of whether Brazil 1872, with 375 groups, is included in the regression.
See Appendix, section C.6.
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To sum up, there are two main messages from Figure 2. First, the level of
pre-industrial Gini coefficients is in general sensitive to assumptions on within-
group dispersions. Second, the ordering of societies with respect to each other
experiences some changes; around 10% of all compared pairs change order when
the coefficient of variation within groups goes from 0 to 1. This is a relatively
low number, and as will be seen in Section 4, it does not affect the relationship
between growth and inequality.
3.2 The contributions of subgroups to inequality
As discussed in the previous section, the increase in inequality comes both from
inequality within and across groups. Using Equation (6), we can look at the
contributions of group pairs to inequality. From each pair of groups, we get the
weighted sum of pairwise income differences between individuals of the groups. As
an example, consider the social table for Byzantium, AD 1000, as given in Table
1. A Gini decomposition based on group pairs, with within-group dispersion at
c = 1, is given in Table 7.
The upper panel shows the entire Gini coefficient. The diagonal is the within-
group Gini components; these would all be zero if there was no within-group
dispersion. The other cells in the upper panel are the across-group components.
Because groups are weighted by products of group sizes and incomes, small groups
only add to inequality if differences between groups are very big. The lower row
(j = 8) gives the contributions from the “nobility” group with very high income;
because the difference from other groups is so big, interactions with this group
contribute greatly to inequality. The most sizable contributions come from the
interaction of the very small, very rich mobility group (j = 8) with the two poor,
very big tenant and farmer groups (i = 1, i = 3). The sum of all the cells in the
upper panel is the total Gini coefficient for this population, given a within-group
coefficient of variation of 1.
Most of the large effects from group income differences come from the dif-
ferences between group means, and are as such contained in the between-group
Gini (GB). The lower panel subtracts the between-group components,
19 giving the
19GB is given in Equation (7).
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............................................
..
............
..
............
..
..
...........
..
............................ ..
............
..
..
............
..
..........
GA
GWAll Gini components (GA +GW )
i = 1
j = 1 3.4 i = 2
j = 2 0.4 0.0 i = 3
j = 3 10.1 0.5 7.3 i = 4
j = 4 0.8 0.0 1.2 0.0 i = 5
j = 5 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 i = 6
j = 6 3.1 0.2 4.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 i = 7
j = 7 1.3 0.1 1.8 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 i = 8
j = 8 10.3 0.6 14.5 0.8 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.1
............................................
..
............
..
............
..
..
...........
..
............................ ..
............
..
..
............
..
..........
GA −GB
GW“Within” and “overlap” terms (GA −GB +GW )
i = 1
j = 1 3.4 i = 2
j = 2 0.4 0.0 i = 3
j = 3 9.1 0.5 7.3 i = 4
j = 4 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 i = 5
j = 5 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 i = 6
j = 6 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 i = 7
j = 7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 i = 8
j = 8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Table 7: Example of group pair contributions, Byzantium, AD 1000.
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additions to inequality that arise solely from within-group dispersions.
When the between-group inequality is subtracted, nearly all contributions to
inequality from the upper groups disappear. Within-group Gini coefficients, in
particular for i = 1 and i = 3, the largest groups, contribute a total of 11 Gini
points to the total Gini.20 In this case, however, the across-group contribution is
even more important. Inequality across farmers (group 1) and tenants (group 3) -
large groups that have means close together - is particularly evident. This combi-
nation adds 9.1 points to a total Gini coefficient of 64 — nearly half the increase
from the between-group Gini of 41. This highlights the restriction an assumption
of perfect sorting places on inequality. As the means are so close, any perfectly
sorted within-group distribution would have both these groups compressed over a
very short income range.
Table 8 shows the decomposition of the increase in inequality for all the soci-
eties. For no within-group dispersion (c = 0), by construction, the within-group
Gini is zero and the across-group component is equal to the between-group com-
ponent. As c increases, both components go up; with many groups, more of the
increase is in across-group inequality, as more of the possible pairs of people are
in separate groups. Some populations are clear outliers. For example, the social
table for China has nearly all the population in the poorest group, and hence
the “within” term of this group accounts for nearly the entire increase in G for
high c. For Chile, the difference between group means is so big that increasing
within-group dispersion has a less pronounced effect on both components. And for
Naples, where group means are close, nearly all the increasing inequality is from
increases in the across-group component.
3.3 Robustness checks: Removing inequality at the top
and bottom
The standard deviations used in the discussion above are based on conjecture, and
until better data is available, this will continue to be the case. Other objections
could be raised to the use of log-normal distributions. The next paragraphs address
20Throughout the text, Gini coefficients will be scaled to be between 0 and 100; a “Gini point”
refers to a change of 1 in this measure.
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c = 0 c = 1 c = 2
GA GW GA GW GA GW
Roman Empire, 14 (N = 11) 36 0 41 21 44 29
Byzantium, 1000 (N = 8) 41 0 53 11 60 16
England and Wales, 1290 (N = 7) 35 0 49 8 59 11
England and Wales, 1688 (N = 31) 45 0 58 3 68 4
Holland, 1732 (N = 46) 61 0 69 1 77 2
Moghul India, 1750 (N = 4) 39 0 42 17 47 25
England and Wales, 1759 (N = 56) 46 0 60 2 71 2
Old Castille, 1752 (N = 51) 52 0 63 2 72 3
France, 1788 (N = 9) 55 0 62 5 69 7
Nueva Espana, 1790 (N = 3) 63 0 64 10 67 14
England and Wales, 1801 (N = 33) 51 0 61 3 70 4
Netherlands, 1808 (N = 20) 56 0 64 4 71 6
Kingdom of Naples, 1811 (N = 12) 28 0 52 3 64 5
Chile, 1861 (N = 32) 64 0 71 3 78 4
Brazil, 1872 (N = 375) 40 0 56 2 68 3
Peru, 1876 (N = 9) 41 0 53 7 63 10
China, 1880 (N = 3) 24 0 24 32 25 46
Java, 1880 (N = 32) 39 0 53 6 63 9
Maghreb, 1880 (N = 8) 57 0 63 7 68 10
Kenya, 1914 (N = 13) 33 0 36 24 39 33
Java, 1924 (N = 14) 32 0 49 6 61 8
Kenya, 1927 (N = 13) 42 0 46 17 51 25
Siam, 1929 (N = 21) 48 0 60 2 70 3
British India, 1947 (N = 8) 48 0 56 7 64 9
Table 8: Gini coefficients decomposed for different levels of within-group dispersion
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two of these.
Richer groups
For the richer income groups of historical inequality data (the upper social classes),
we often have more detailed information on group structures. Hence, imposing the
log-normal distribution, with positive mass across the entire income spectrum and
a left-skewed distribution, might be harder to accept for these groups.
However, these upper groups are typically small, and it turns out that the
contribution to aggregate inequality from dispersion within these groups is also
small. As an example, consider the decomposition illustration of Table 7.
As is seen in the left column of the upper panel, the contributions to overall
Gini from the richest group (j = 8) are substantial, even though it only consists of
one per cent of the total population. However, all of this contribution comes from
the difference in group means, which is present before the within-group dispersion
is introduced. If we remove the between-group inequality, and move to the lower
panel, it is clear that the contribution of the upper group is very low. As there is
almost no overlap with the other groups, and the population of the richest group
is low, the contribution of the richest group to the increased dispersion is almost
zero.
Similar exercises can be conducted for the other social tables. Counting the
“inequality contribution” from a group as all terms in (6) that include the group,
we can check how much the richer groups contribute to overall inequality. Taking
as the threshold any groups with a mean income of more than five times the
population mean, and using the assumptions of c = 1, the result of this accounting
exercise shows that there are no large contributions by the rich groups.21 Even for
the cases where these groups make up a considerable size of the population (they
are largest in France and New Spain), the contribution from these groups only
make up a small factor of the inequality that is added by within-group dispersion.
It follows that removing the assumption of log-normal distributions within groups
for the richer groups would not significantly alter the results in this paper.
21The table is given in the Appendix: Table C.6
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Poorer groups and subsistence minima
Log-normal distributions have positive mass across the entire positive income
range. Hence, by assuming such distributions within groups, we postulate that
many people are very poor. However, some positive income level needs to be ful-
filled in order to survive - the subsistence income. If we believed that everyone, at
all times, lived at or above subsistence, we would have to revise our assumptions
on within-group distributions. Inequality-limiting subsistence is one the key mes-
sages of Milanovic et al. (2011). As an example, the mean income of “Agricultural
day laborers and servants” in France 1788 was 312 PPP dollars a year. With
subsistence income at 300 dollars (as assumed in their paper), most people in that
group (covering 36 per cent of the population) must have had incomes very close
to the mean.
There is no need to assume that the subsistence border holds with absolute
certainty; indeed, there is ample historical evidence to suggest that large groups
have been living below subsistence level for long periods of time. A notable exam-
ple is given in Clark (2008, chapter 6), where the Malthusian period is described as
a situation with “social mobility and the survival of the richest”. In pre-industrial
England, according to Clark, poor families on average did not replace their popu-
lation, while rich families did; consequently, there was continuous social mobility
downward. However, it is not unlikely that subsistence income plays some role
in truncating income distributions at the bottom, and it is useful to see how the
results presented would change if the income of everyone was above subsistence
minimum. In order to explore the effect on inequality on imposing subsistence
minima, the setup of Section 2 is altered in three ways, using the assumption
c = 1.
The first two adjustments keep the same log-normal distributions, but alter
them at the tails. For the first adjustment, any population below the subsistence
minimum is simply shifted up to the subsistence minimum. This reduces inequality
at the lower end, but skews group means, as the same group-wise log-normal distri-
butions are kept for the rest of the population. The second adjustment addresses
this by also shifting the richest part of the population in each group down to a
“group upper bound”, in such a way as to keep group means at the pre-adjustment
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levels.
The final adjustment is of a different type. Instead of defining the log-normal
distribution on the entire positive income scale (starting at 0), it is defined over the
scale starting at ymin. This means that there is no population mass below ymin. In
practice, this amounts to subtracting ymin from all group means before calculating
the log-normal distributions, and then right-shifting these distributions by ymin.
For each of these three adjustments, the aggregate Gini coefficients are re-
calculated. The calculation is done using numerical methods, calculating all pair-
wise differences in a discrete (but very fine-grained) population space.22
An adjustment by minimum incomes does shift the Gini estimates down for
several populations, while others are virtually unchanged. Three populations stand
out with large corrections: Byzantium and the two Kenya observations. All of these
three have rather low population mean incomes, making the minimum income more
quantitatively important; the population mean in Kenya 1914 is only 50% above
minimum. Here, the same subsistence income is used for all populations; one could
argue that the subsistence level is lower in tropical areas. If subsistence income
in Kenya is actually lower, the downward revision of the Gini coefficient would be
less.
A strong downward change in the Gini is expected across the line, as assump-
tions of no population mass below minimum income correspond directly to assump-
tions of very low within-group inequality at the bottom of the income distribution.
The fact that substantial inequality (inequality above GB) remains even after such
an extreme revision shows that group overlap always needs to be accounted for
when using group data, even if one adheres strongly to limiting subsistence in-
comes.
4 Inequality and economic growth
4.1 The Kuznets curve
Milanovic et al. (2011) do not discuss the evolution of inequality with economic
22A full description of the adjustments, as well as a table of results, is shown in the Appendix,
see Table C.7.
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activity except for the hypothesis on the relationship between subsistence income
and feasible inequality. However, with the data available, and the framework for
interpolating inequality in place, we have the opportunity to re-visit the broad
sweeps of Kuznets and van Zanden: that inequality should increase with economic
activity in pre-industrial societies. Moreover, the differences between pre-industrial
and modern inequality can be assessed.
Estimates on GDP per capita have been made available by Maddison (2010)
and can be used for a simple linear regression of inequality on economic activity.23
By the conventional view of the Kuznets curve, we should expect an increasing
relationship between GDP per capita and inequality as measured by the Gini
coefficient. Figure 3 plots these variables against each other for the different as-
sumption sets; the dotted lines represent results of linear regressions for each of
the sets, as detailed in Table 9, and each set of symbols correspond to one set of
assumptions on within-group dispersion.
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const −46.222 −32.721 −35.056 2.446 30.744∗ 56.177∗∗∗ −20.402
(28.566) (29.022) (27.365) (22.034) (16.228) (10.273) (31.014)
log (GDI/capita) 13.509∗∗∗ 11.702∗∗ 12.053∗∗∗ 7.585∗∗ 4.759∗ 2.656∗ 12.237∗∗
(4.230) (4.297) (4.052) (3.263) (2.403) (1.521) (4.592)
R2 0.317 0.252 0.287 0.197 0.151 0.122 0.244
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Table 9: Regression results under assumption set (1)-(7); see Table 6 for definitions
of the assumptions. {***,**,*}=significant at {99%,95%,90%} level (two-sided
tests)
There is a positive relationship between inequality and economic activity level
for all seven sets of Gini coefficient estimates. For the highest within-group dis-
persion (regressions 5 and 6), significance does not hold at the 95% level; for all
the others, it does.
A coefficient of 13 (as in specification 1) corresponds to an increase of 0.13 Gini
points (where the Gini is scaled between 0 and 100) when GDP increases by one
percent. The point estimates are lower for higher dispersions.
The results confirm the hypothesis of Van Zanden (1995) that inequality was
23The GDI per capita estimates are those used by Milanovic et al. (2011); Table 1, p. 7.
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Figure 3: The relationship between Gini coefficients and GDI per capita for various
assumptions
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increasing well before the Industrial Revolution. With the exception for the very
highest dispersion (specification 6), the results are robust to changing to a linear
specification and to splitting the dataset into West Europe and the rest of the
world.
4.2 Pre-industrial vs. modern inequality
While the relationship between pre-industrial inequality estimates are robust to
changes in within-group dispersions, comparison with modern data is not. Figure 4
compares the pre-industrial inequality ranges to modern inequality observations, as
used by Milanovic et al. (2011). The upper two panels compare Western countries.
As is evident, both for the lower and higher ranges, pre-industrial inequality was
higher than modern inequality, with only a slight overlap where the United States
and Italy are more unequal than some of the lower estimates for pre-industrial
inequality.
Now turn to the lower two panels, comparing pre-industrial and modern in-
equality for today’s developing countries. It is clear that now the assumptions
matter much more. Milanovic et al. state that “inequality differences within the
pre-industrial and modern samples are many times greater than are differences be-
tween their averages”. Their data implies that the most unequal societies today —
South Africa and Brazil — have much higher inequality than most pre-industrial
societies. From the figure it is evident that such a conclusion depends on specific
assumptions on the within-group dispersions. With the uncertainty implied by the
lower left panel, it is hard to compare the pre-industrial developing countries to
their modern counterparts without more information on within-group dispersion.
Another interesting exercise is to compare the pre-industrial Western economies
(upper left panel) to modern developing countries (lower right). The GDI per
capita of the poorer developing countries is in the same range as the European
countries of the eighteenth century. Still, for most societies and for most sets of
assumptions, the European countries were more unequal then than the developing
countries are now. There are many possible explanations for this; such as more
equal land ownership, better food production technologies, or improvement of
democracy.
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Given the wide range of variance assumptions used here, we can conclude that,
barring any better country-specific data on within-group inequality, the data con-
firms both increasing inequality in pre-industrial societies and decreasing inequality
after industrialization, at least for today’s developed countries. One explanation
for the lagging decrease in inequality in developing countries could be that the
industrialization (or rather, modernization) process has not come far enough; they
are still on the upward-sloping part of the Kuznets curve, or just past the peak.
These result are not dramatically different from previous studies on long-run
inequality developments. The study of Bourguignon & Morrisson (2002) on world
inequality after 1820 aims to cover the whole world by interpolating between coun-
tries and years where data is known. They find a hump-shaped profile of within-
country (or rather, within “group of country”) inequality in Western countries,
with a peak in the late nineteenth century. For developing countries their data
contains much more interpolation; the least prosperous country groups have in-
creasing within-country inequality for the whole period. Somewhat similar results
are found by Baten et al. (2009), using similar data but supplementing it with
data on unskilled wages.
Economic historians now tend to tone down the emphasis on the industrial de-
velopment on the nineteenth century and focus more on longer development arches
(Crafts & Harley, 1992), which increases the need for broad empirical evidence on
the “pre-industrial” period. Moreover, economists are becoming increasingly inter-
ested in the long-run interrelationships between inequality and investment. Sev-
eral particular institutional developments have been postulated to be influenced
by inequality; see for example Sokoloff & Engerman (2000) on the difference in
development paths between North and South America and Galor & Moav (2006)
and Galor et al. (2009) on the development of modern education systems. Get-
ting better historical inequality data, and making better use of what is available,
is critical to evaluate these claims. In that sense, it is reassuring that the main
results on growth and inequality are shown to be robust. Further work should be
able to explore in more detail the implications of inequality differences between
the countries analyzed here.
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5 Conclusion
This article has shown that when accounting for within-group inequality in social
tables, reported inequality goes up by a large amount. The increase comes from
both within- and across-group inequality, and is particularly important in the case
where groups are large and have means that are close to each other.
Moreover, the non-monotone link between growth and inequality is confirmed;
the data supports the long-run development of inequality as proposed by Kuznets
(1955) and Van Zanden (1995). The result that inequality increases with modern-
ization, only to decrease with development levels seen in the West over the last
century, is robust to changing assumptions on within-group inequality.
With further research, we can expect to see more tabulations of income and
wealth data from pre-industrial societies. For statistics of a social table format,
where within-group dispersion is not given, this paper presents a straightforward,
transparent way of calculating inequality. The method can also be useful for
modern data. While nation-wide distribution data now exist for most countries,
within-group data is frequently missing for subnational entities or social classes.
The approach presented in this paper can be used in these cases, to put struc-
ture on and properly evaluate any type of incomplete data on income or wealth
distributions.
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A Appendix: Data
A.1 Pre-industrial inequality data
These three sources are used in Section 1.3.24
Tuscany, 1427: The Catasto gives wealth information for the entire popula-
tion of Florence and the immediate surroundings; 85.4% of households (87.8% of
the population) are reported as having positive wealth. The population are di-
vided into 97 different occupational groups, some with only one household. There
are 9780 households and a total population of 38269. MLW use income data from
other sources to assess inequality; this does not give a source of within-occupation
variation and hence cannot be used here. For this reason, the within-group anal-
ysis is used only on wealth inequality. In keeping with MLW, the population
with “no occupation given” are grouped together (they define it as “predomi-
nantly rural”). Source: Data downloaded from http://www.stg.brown.edu/
projects/catasto. Full citation: Online Catasto of 1427. Version 1.3. Edited by
David Herlihy, Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, R. Burr Litchfield and Anthony Molho.
[Machine readable data file based on D. Herlihy and C. Klapisch-Zuber, Census
and Property Survey of Florentine Domains in the Province of Tuscany, 1427-
1480.] Florentine Renaissance Resources/STG: Brown University, Providence,
R.I., 2002.
Bihar, 1807: Expenditure is given as household total; expenditure per capita
is found by dividing by household size. Both expenditure and household size are
given as (narrow) intervals; a mean value has been used for both in the calculation.
The expenditure data is reported separately for 17 districts, one of which is Patna
city. Here, all other districts are grouped together as “rural”. Source: Mont-
gomery Martin: “The history, antiquities, topography, and statistics of Eastern
India, Volume I: Behar (Patna City) and Shahabad”. London, W. H. Allen and
Co., 1838. Appendix pages 6 and 7.
Norway, 1868: The source is a report published by the Department of Justice
listing incomes for all males above 25 years of age with income above 100SPD (400
24The first two are also used (aggregately) by Milanovic et al. (2011); when referring to that
data set, their tabulations and calculations are used rather than the original sources. These are
documented at http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/Distribution.htm.
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kr) and not belonging to the servant class. The total number of persons tabulated
above the lower threshold amounts to 37.7% of the above-25 male population
in the census of 1865; hence, around the upper third of the income distribution
is covered (allowing for some population growth 1865-1868). This means that
for the more prestigous occupations, coverage is near-complete, while for other
occupations, the report only gives the upper tail of the distribution. There are a
total of 26 occupations listed, divided into five income categories (100, 100-150,
150-200, 200-250, 250+). When calculating Gini coefficients, group mean incomes
of 100, 125, 175, 225 and 400 are assumed; when fitting CDF functions, the four
group borders are used. Source: “Tabeller til oplysning om stemmerets- indtægts-
og skatteforholdene i Norge i aaret 1868”. Udgivet av Justits-Departementet.
Christiania, 1871. Table II, page 3.
Lognormality of pre-industrial distributions
As mentioned in the main text, a proper test of lognormality is hard to conduct
on the pre-industrial data, as it is still “bracketed”. For Bihar, the population is
still grouped within households, some of the households are very large and it is
implicitly assumed (both here and in MLW) that there is a perfectly egalitarian
distribution within households. For Tuscany, the households are smaller but the
problem exists to some extent. In addition, some occupation groups are very small.
For Norway, there is only five bracketed income groups.
However, for the bracketed Norwegian data we can check how well the bracket
borders (which correspond to well-defined points on the cumulative distribution
function) correspond to an idealized lognormal distribution. This is done by a vari-
ant of a QQ-plot, plotting the idealized cumulative densities against the empirical
densities for each group. The same exercise is done for the other two populations,
but with the caveat of the undecided within-household distributions.
The plots are shown in Table A.1.25 For Tuscany, the degree of fit varies
between groups (only groups with more than 200 households are shown). For
Bihar, the urban distribution has a good fit while the rural has not; this might be
25The Tuscan groups correspond are the ones numbered 0, 13, 21, 24, 29, 46 and 61 (in that
order) in the original source, where a fuller description (with Italian-language titles) is given.
The Norwegian groups are also presented in the same order as in the Norwegian-language source.
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related to the fact that there are more large households (and hence a less smooth
dataset) in the rural area.
For Norway, the fit is very good for the more prestigous occupations, such as
the high-level civil servants. For the other occupations, such as the workers, the
problem of missing coverage of the lower part of the income distribution makes
the fit somewhat worse.
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A.2 Modern inequality data
A.2.1 The level of within-group dispersion
The underlying information for Section 2.4 is in Table A.1.
The data has been compiled by IPUMS (Minnesota Population Center, 2010).
As reported by IPUMS, the statistical data was originally produced by
• Brazil: Institute of Geography and Statistics
• Canada: Statistics Canada
• Colombia: National Administrative Department of Statistics
• Mexico: National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics
• Panama: Census and Statistics Directorate
• Puerto Rico: U.S. Bureau of the Census
• South Africa: Statistics South Africa
• United States: Bureau of the Census
• Venezuela: National Institute of Statistics
A.2.2 The distribution of within-group dispersion: c and the number
of groups
The relationship between the number of groups and the average coefficient of vari-
ation is shown in Table A.2. For each sample (Country and Year), the coefficient
of variation is calculated for each group and the average over these groups are then
taken. This average is then regressed on the number of groups in each sample. As
the table shows, for no classification is there a significant correlation at the 95%
level.
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A.2.3 The distribution of within-group dispersion: c and mean income
Tables A.3 and A.4 show the relationship between the coefficient of variance and
the mean income of each group. Here the regression is done within each sample.
We see that in most cases the 95%-interval covers zero, meaning the correlations
are not significant; however, for the “industry” classification we have a substantial
number of coefficients significantly different from zero (always on the negative
side). For this reason, a robustness check is done where β is set to -0.3 instead
of 0 as in the main text (using the log-log specification). The results from this
robustness check are shown in Section C.3.
Dependent variable: Average coefficient of variation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Classification Occ Ind Class Class det. All
Const -8.212 -3.435 -4.993 2.031 2.683∗∗
(9.370) (6.619) (5.380) (2.611) (1.140)
Number of groups 1.108 0.408 3.230 0.171 0.412
(0.996) (0.472) (1.949) (0.430) (0.302)
R2 0.044 0.027 0.092 0.006 0.040
N 29 29 29 29 116
Table A.2: Lack of correlation between average coefficient of variation and num-
ber of groups. Regression (5) pools 1-4 and has dummies for each of the four
classifications. {***,**,*}=significant at {99%,95%,90%} level (two-sided tests)
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B Appendix: Calculations of expressions
B.1 Calculation of Equation (5)
This section shows the derivation of Equation (5), using the definition of the Gini
coefficient as the area below the Lorenz curve. The calculation is an extension
of Aitchison & Brown (1957)’s one-group case, and makes use of some convenient
properties of the log-normal distribution.
Denote the log-normal population density functions as f(x;µi, σ
2
i ) and the cor-
responding CDF as F (x;µi, σ
2
i ) =
∫ x
0
f(u, µi, σ
2
i )du. Throughout this section,
without loss of generality, group means will be rescaled to population means; that
is, the population mean is always 1.
First, as stated by Aitchison & Brown, Theorem 2.6, page 12
1
yi
∫ x
0
uf(u;µi, σ
2
i )du =
∫ x
0
f(u;µi + σ
2
i , σ
2
i )du (9)
where yi is the group mean.
Secondly, from Aitchison & Brown, Corollary 2.2b, page 11
∫ ∞
0
F (ax;µ1, σ
2
1)dF (x;µ2, σ
2
2) = F (a;µ1 − µ2, σ21 + σ22) (10)
Now consider a piecewise log-normal distribution, with the probability density
function
g(x) =
N∑
i=1
pif(x;µi, σ
2
i ) (11)
The Lorenz curve plots cumulative population against cumulative income. Let-
ting both axes run over income x, cumulative population is G(x) =
∫ x
0
g(u)du while
cumulative income is V (x) =
∫ x
0
ug(u)du.
By (9), cumulative income is
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V (x) =
∫ x
0
u
N∑
i=0
pif(u;µi, σ
2
i )du (12)
=
N∑
i=1
piyi
(
1
mi
∫ x
0
uf(u;µi, σ
2
i )du
)
(13)
=
N∑
i=1
piyi
(∫ x
0
f(u;µi + σ
2
i , σ
2
i )du
)
(14)
=
N∑
i=1
piyiF (x;µi + σ
2
i , σ
2
i ) (15)
Denote the total area below the Lorenz curve as H. It can be expressed as
H =
∫ ∞
0
V (x)d [G(x)] (16)
=
∫ ∞
0
N∑
i=1
[
piyi
(
F (x;µi + σ
2
i , σ
2
i )
)]
d
[
N∑
j=1
(
pjF (x;µj, σ
2
j )
)]
(17)
=
N∑
i=1
(
piyi
∫ ∞
0
F (x;µi + σ
2
i , σ
2
i )d
[
N∑
j=1
(
pjF (x;µj, σ
2
j )
)])
(18)
Reordering and using (10) to get
H =
N∑
i=1
(
piyi
N∑
j=1
pj
(∫ ∞
0
F (x;µi + σ
2
i , σ
2
i )d
[
F (x;µj, σ
2
j )
]))
(19)
=
N∑
i=1
(
piyi
N∑
j=1
pj
(
F (1; (µi − µj) + σ2i , σ2i + σ2j )
))
(20)
=
N∑
i=1
(
yi
N∑
j=1
pipj
(
F (1; (µi − µj) + σ2i , σ2i + σ2j )
))
(21)
Letting FN denote a normal distribution and Φ its standardized variant, this
can further be written as
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H =
N∑
i=1
(
yi
N∑
j=1
pipj
(
FN(0; (µi − µj) + σ2i , σ2i + σ2j )
))
(22)
=
N∑
i=1
yi N∑
j=1
pipj
Φ
0− (µi − µj + σ2i )√
σ2i + σ
2
j
 (23)
=
N∑
i=1
yi N∑
j=1
pipjΦ
−(µi − µj + σ2i )√
σ2i + σ
2
j
 (24)
= 1−
N∑
i=1
yi N∑
j=1
pipjΦ
µi − µj + σ2i√
σ2i + σ
2
j
 (25)
Finally, by the definition of the Gini coefficient,
G = 1− 2H (26)
= 2
N∑
i=1
yi N∑
j=1
pipjΦ
µi − µj + σ2i√
σ2i + σ
2
j
− 1 (27)
B.2 Calculation of cw
This section outlines the calculation of cw. First, consider the more general case,
where the relationship between standard deviations and group means are
si
y¯
= α
(
yi
y¯
)β
(28)
αw is defined as the α that makes the average of within-group Gini coefficients
equal to the between-group Gini coefficient.
From Equations (2) and (28), we get
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σ =
√
log (1 + α2(yi/y¯)2β−2) (29)
αw is then defined by the α that makes the average within-group Gini coefficient
(right-hand side below) equal to the between-group Gini coefficient (left-hand side
below; calculated from y and p).
GB =
N∑
i=1
pi2Φ
[√
1
2
log (1 + α2w(yi/y¯)
2β−2)
]
− 1 (30)
This is solved numerically when β 6= 1.
Note that when β = 1, cw = αw. In this case:
GB = 2Φ
(√
1
2
log [1 + α2w]
)
− 1 (31)
αw = cw =
√√√√exp(2 [Φ−1(GB + 1
2
)]2)
− 1 (32)
For β = 1, all within-Ginis will be equal to the between-Gini. For β 6= 1,
the average of within-Ginis will be equal to the between-Gini. This means that
alternate averages (weighting by yip
2
i instead of pi, for example) would produce
different values for αw if β 6= 1, but do not matter for β = 1.
B.3 Calculating decile shares
When a fuller knowledge of the aggregate distribution is desirable, one can calcu-
late percentile shares. In the following, ten groups will be assumed (deciles), but
any partition is possible.
Let d be the vector of population lower bounds for the groups (d = {0, .1, .2, .3, ..., .9}).
Without loss of generality, rescale income so that the population mean is 1.
The lower income bounds a are then found numerically by solving
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N∑
i=1
(
piF (aj;µi, σ
2
i )
)− dj = 0; (33)
for each j ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., 10}. (Trivially, a1 = 0). As F is strictly increasing,
(33) only has one solution for each j.
The upper bounds b are then the lower bounds of the group above, bj = aj+1;
b10 =∞.
The mean income of each decile is
δj =
N∑
i=1
pi
∫ bj
aj
uf(u;µi, σ
2
i )du (34)
=
N∑
i=1
pi
(∫ bj
0
uf(u;µi, σ
2
i )du−
∫ aj
0
uf(u;µi, σ
2
i )du
)
(35)
From Equation (9) this equals
δj =
N∑
i=1
piyi
[∫ bj
0
f(u;µi + σ
2
i , σ
2
i )du−
∫ aj
0
f(u;µi + σ
2
i , σ
2
i )du
]
(36)
=
N∑
i=1
piyi
[
F (bj;µi + σ
2
i , σ
2
i )− F (aj;µi + σ2i , σ2i )
]
(37)
From this, for each decile group j, we know the bounds (aj, bj) and the mean
income δj.
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C Appendix: Robustness
C.1 Kuznets curve regression robustness: Other function
forms
Kuznets curve regressions with linear and log-log specifications are shown in Ta-
bles C.1 and C.2. As is evident from the tables, the result is robust to changing
specifications, with the exception of the very highest level of within-group disper-
sion.
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const 33.744∗∗∗ 36.493∗∗∗ 36.242∗∗∗ 47.233∗∗∗ 58.805∗∗∗ 71.810∗∗∗ 51.883∗∗∗
(4.252) (4.283) (4.053) (3.228) (2.367) (1.494) (4.562)
GDI/capita 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.002 0.011∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
R2 0.280 0.226 0.256 0.181 0.142 0.117 0.223
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Table C.1: Regression results under assumption set (1)-(7) (see Table 6 for defini-
tions of the assumptions). {***,**,*}=significant at {99%,95%,90%} level (two-
sided tests)
Dependent variable: Log Gini coefficient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const 1.691∗∗ 2.026∗∗∗ 2.032∗∗∗ 3.028∗∗∗ 3.633∗∗∗ 4.065∗∗∗ 2.774∗∗∗
(0.674) (0.685) (0.610) (0.405) (0.254) (0.137) (0.517)
log (GDI/capita) 0.309∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.075∗ 0.035∗ 0.199∗∗
(0.100) (0.101) (0.090) (0.060) (0.038) (0.020) (0.077)
R2 0.303 0.235 0.279 0.198 0.152 0.122 0.234
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Table C.2: Regression results under assumption set (1)-(7) (see Table 6 for defini-
tions of the assumptions). {***,**,*}=significant at {99%,95%,90%} level (two-
sided tests)
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C.2 Kuznets curve robustness: Restricting the sample
Tables C.3 and C.4 show the results of the Kuznets curve regression for limited
samples, where “West European” refers to the early modern West European sam-
ples.
Though the number of observations with the split sample is too low to properly
compare the effects, one can observe that the slope parameter is higher for the non-
West European countries — perhaps reflecting that the West European countries
are closer to the end of the era when the mechanisms of increasing inequality
operate, with relatively high levels of GDP per capita.
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const 31.321∗∗∗ 32.376∗∗∗ 33.047∗∗∗ 43.063∗∗∗ 54.989∗∗∗ 69.011∗∗∗ 46.501∗∗∗
(7.859) (7.984) (7.559) (5.700) (4.002) (2.452) (8.397)
GDI/capita 0.012∗ 0.012∗ 0.011∗ 0.008∗ 0.006∗ 0.004∗ 0.013∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006)
R2 0.418 0.393 0.409 0.397 0.400 0.406 0.418
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Table C.3: Regression results under assumption set (1)-(7) (see Table 6 for defini-
tions of the assumptions). {***,**,*}=significant at {99%,95%,90%} level (two-
sided tests). Restricted to only West European countries.
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const 21.350∗∗ 26.085∗∗ 25.228∗∗ 39.652∗∗∗ 53.454∗∗∗ 68.538∗∗∗ 41.374∗∗∗
(9.054) (9.255) (8.649) (7.058) (5.198) (3.278) (9.893)
GDI/capita 0.031∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.013∗ 0.008 0.028∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.014)
R2 0.323 0.255 0.297 0.230 0.208 0.194 0.244
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Table C.4: Regression results under assumption set (1)-(7) (see Table 6 for defini-
tions of the assumptions). {***,**,*}=significant at {99%,95%,90%} level (two-
sided tests). Restricted to only non-West European countries.
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C.3 More general specification of variance structure
As noted in Footnote 15, a more general specification of the variance structure
is ci = α(yi/y¯)
β. The specification used in the main text — with the coefficient
of variation constant — corresponds to β = 0. However, cases could be made for
other relationships between group mean and group dispersion; that is, other values
for β. Figure C.1 and Table C.5 show the results for β = −0.3. As shown, the
results in the main text still hold up, the only difference being lower significance
for some of the higher Kuznets curve estimates.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Nueva Espana, 1790 N=3
Chile, 1861 N=32
Holland, 1732 N=46
Maghreb, 1880 N=8
Netherlands, 1808 N=20
France, 1788 N=9
Old Castille, 1752 N=51
England and Wales, 1801 N=33
Siam, 1929 N=21
British India, 1947 N=8
England and Wales, 1759 N=56
England and Wales, 1688 N=31
Kenya, 1927 N=13
Peru, 1876 N=9
Byzantium, 1000 N=8
Java, 1880 N=32
Brazil, 1872 N=375
Moghul India, 1750 N=4
Roman Empire,   14 N=11
England and Wales, 1290 N=7
Kenya, 1914 N=13
Java, 1924 N=14
Kingdom of Naples, 1811 N=12
China, 1880 N=3
Gini coefficient
 
 
MLW Gini1
MLW Gini2
α = 0.1 β = −0.3
α = 0.5 β = −0.3
α = 1.0 β = −0.3
α = 2.0 β = −0.3
α = α
w
 β = −0.3
Figure C.1: Comparison of Gini coefficients for the seven assumption sets; β =
−0.3
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Dependent variable: Gini coefficient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const −46.222 −32.721 −33.790 6.127 34.960∗∗ 59.856∗∗∗ −15.254
(28.566) (29.022) (27.352) (22.123) (16.428) (10.466) (29.667)
log (GDI/capita) 13.509∗∗∗ 11.702∗∗ 11.891∗∗∗ 7.187∗∗ 4.302∗ 2.210 11.367∗∗
(4.230) (4.297) (4.050) (3.276) (2.433) (1.550) (4.393)
R2 0.317 0.252 0.282 0.179 0.124 0.085 0.233
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Table C.5: Regression results under assumption set (1)-(7) where the assumption
set numbers refer to Figure C.1
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C.4 The inequality impact of upper groups
Results are shown in Table C.6.
As we count all terms except the within-group cells (the diagonal) as belonging
to two groups, the sum of all these terms is not the overall Gini. In the table, the
column “contributions of rich groups” includes all terms where the rich groups
are at least one of the groups. For example, for the Byzantine example (Table
7), if the two richest groups were included as “rich”, all cells that are part of
the two rightmost columns and/or the two lowest rows would be included; the
(i = 7, j = 8) cell would not be counted twice toward the inequality contribution.
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N N r nr G GW G
r
W GR G
r
R
Roman Empire, 14 11 6 0.04 61 21 0 4 0
Byzantium, 1000 8 1 0.01 64 11 0 12 0
England and Wales, 1290 7 1 0.04 56 8 0 13 0
England and Wales, 1688 31 8 0.02 61 3 0 13 0
Holland, 1732 46 15 0.04 70 1 0 8 1
Moghul India, 1750 4 1 0.01 59 17 0 3 0
England and Wales, 1759 56 13 0.02 61 2 0 14 0
Old Castille, 1752 51 9 0.04 65 2 0 10 1
France, 1788 9 2 0.10 67 5 1 7 1
Nueva Espana, 1790 3 1 0.10 74 10 3 1 0
England and Wales, 1801 33 8 0.04 64 3 0 10 1
Netherlands, 1808 20 10 0.03 68 4 0 7 0
Kingdom of Naples, 1811 12 1 0.01 55 3 0 24 0
Chile, 1861 32 6 0.05 74 3 0 8 1
Brazil, 1872 375 114 0.01 58 2 0 16 0
Peru, 1876 9 2 0.02 61 7 0 12 0
China, 1880 3 2 0.02 56 32 0 0 0
Java, 1880 32 22 0.01 59 6 0 14 0
Maghreb, 1880 8 1 0.01 71 7 0 7 0
Kenya, 1914 13 8 0.01 59 24 0 3 0
Java, 1924 14 2 0.01 55 6 0 17 0
Kenya, 1927 13 8 0.01 64 17 0 5 0
Siam, 1929 21 1 0.01 62 2 0 11 0
British India, 1947 8 2 0.01 63 7 0 8 0
Table C.6: Inequality contribution from the richest groups. Superscript r denotes
contributions from groups with mean incomes more than five times greater than
population mean
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C.5 Adding subsistence income
This explains the numerical procedure used to calculate the values in Table C.7,
discussed in Section 3.3.
A population grid X of 50 000 points is constructed, with points spaced equally
apart in logs (more points at the bottom). This combines the need for high accu-
racy at the bottom (where there is high “population density”) with the need for
covering large income ranges at the top (where density is lower, and one does not
need as fine a grid). The grid runs from zero to 10 000 times the mean income
of the richest group. A weight is assigned to each grid point corresponding to the
inverse of the spacing of points.
Adjustments 1 and 2
The log-normal PDF is then calculated for each of these points for each group,
and the distributions normalized to group sizes.
As y is already normalized so that the population mean is 1, subsistence income
is found by inverting the number “mean income in terms of s” found in Table 2 of
Milanovic et al. (2011). When the lowest income group has lower mean income than
this subsistence group, the lowest group mean income will be chosen, subtracting
0.0001 (the scaling is population mean) to allow for some very small dispersion at
the bottom group; this does not alter the results, but simplifies the calculation.
Then, for each population group, the total mass of everyone below subsistence
income P is calculated, replacing the pdf values for these grid points with 0, and
adding P to the distribution at the first grid point above subsistence.
For adjustment 2, in addition, a “richness line” R is introduced. Starting at
the upper end of each group, move everyone above the richness line (the total mass
of people in the group with income above R) down to the first grid point below
R. Then decrease R until this procedure makes the mean of the group equal to
the pre-adjustment mean.
Finally, all the group distributions are summed into a population distribution.
Then, defining all grid points as discrete groups (ie 50 000 groups), (7) is used to
calculate the overall Gini coefficient.
Adjustment 3
The log-normal distribution is now calculated on X − ymin instead of on X,
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for each group (ymin is found in the same way as for the previous adjustments).
Then, the complete distributions are right-shifted by ymin again, before they are
added. Then, Gini coefficients can be computed on the grid points in the same
manner as for adjustments 1 and 2.
Benchmark
An unadjusted Gini coefficient is also calculated by the numerical method. The
largest deviations on the unadjusted Gini comparied to coefficients calculated by
Equation 5 are .09 Gini points (.0009) for New Spain and .01 Gini points (.0001) for
Chile; this verifies that the numerical procedure is sufficiently accurate to compare
the benchmark to the adjusted values.
Detailed results
Table C.7 shows the results.
Subsistence incomes are taken from Table 2 of Milanovic et al. (2011); however,
in many cases (denoted by an asterisk in the table) the mean income of the poorest
group is lower than this subsistence level. In those cases subsistence minimum is
set to the mean income of the poorest group.
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ymin Benchmark G Adj. 1 Adj. 2 Adj. 3 Benchmark GB
Roman Empire, 14 0.48 61 55 45 47 36
Byzantium, 1000 0.56 64 55 42 44 41
England and Wales, 1290 0.47∗ 56 50 44 44 35
England and Wales, 1688 0.21∗ 61 59 58 57 45
Holland, 1732 0.07∗ 70 70 70 70 61
Moghul India, 1750 0.30∗ 59 56 54 53 39
England and Wales, 1759 0.17 61 60 60 59 46
Old Castille, 1752 0.07∗ 65 65 65 64 52
France, 1788 0.26 67 63 61 62 55
Nueva Espana, 1790 0.24∗ 74 71 68 69 63
England and Wales, 1801 0.11∗ 64 64 64 63 51
Netherlands, 1808 0.17 68 67 66 65 56
Kingdom of Naples, 1811 0.45 55 49 43 43 28
Chile, 1861 0.16∗ 74 73 72 71 64
Brazil, 1872 0.23∗ 58 56 55 54 40
Peru, 1876 0.33∗ 61 57 54 53 41
China, 1880 0.56 56 48 37 39 24
Java, 1880 0.31∗ 59 56 54 53 39
Maghreb, 1880 0.32∗ 71 66 62 63 57
Kenya, 1914 0.66∗ 59 48 34 34 33
Java, 1924 0.33 55 52 49 48 32
Kenya, 1927 0.53 64 55 44 48 42
Siam, 1929 0.18∗ 62 61 60 59 48
British India, 1947 0.23∗ 63 60 59 59 48
Table C.7: The Gini coefficients under different assumptions on minimum incomes,
with c = 1
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C.6 Gini and number of groups relationship
A regression of Gini coefficients on the number of groups, for c = 1, is shown in
Table C.8. The point estimate is very close to zero, and not significant. Brazil
(with N = 375) is an outlier in terms of number of groups and was not included
in the regression shown here. Including Brazil in the regressions does not change
the sign or significance level of the coefficients.
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const 0.450∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.018) (0.013) (0.008) (0.026)
Number of groups −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.015 0.023 0.029 0.005
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Table C.8: Lack of correlation between Gini coefficient and number of groups.
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